Part I of this paper explores traditional corporate, agency, and tort law concepts. These include the corporate law doctrine that shields the corporate owners-shareholders-from liability in most instances. It also examines traditional tort law rules that impose liability upon a corporate officer for his or her own wrongful acts, and agency rules of respondeat superior that would impute that individual's actions to the corporation. Part II examines officer liability under the Patent Act, finding that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") has inappropriately imposed liability upon corporate officers through a distorted application of piercing doctrine. In effect, the Federal Circuit uses doctrine applicable only to corporate owner liability to reach corporate officers. Similarly, Part III examines individual officer liability for copyright infringement, finding that the regional circuit courts of appeal apply a vicarious liability test that is not only inapposite to officer liability, but in some ways mimics the piercing analysis used by the Federal Circuit in the patent law arena and in other ways replicates the personal participation test of traditional doctrine. Part IV discusses why individual officer liability is so muddled in both patent and copyright law, and concludes that current case law reflects an instinctive rejection by the courts of application of strict liability to individuals. The courts' subconscious efforts to reach liability standards and outcomes that are fault-based, rather than strict, for corporate officers have caused the courts to create sui generis officer liability rules that are at odds with traditional doctrine. The goal of the courts is laudable, but their approach creates uncertainty and may impose liability in inappropriate situations. I propose a more direct approach to imposition of personal liability on corporate officers that focuses on culpability.
I. CORPORATE OFFICER LIABILTY UNDER TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE
Basic to the theory of corporation law is the concept that a corporation is a separate entity, a legal being having an existence separate and distinct from that of its owners. This attribute of the separate corporate personality enables the corporation's stockholders to limit their personal liability to the extent of their investment. . . . The corporate form, however, is not lightly disregarded, since limited liability is one of the principal purposes for which the law has created the corporation.
See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 6.22(b) (2002) ("Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.").
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B. Liability of Corporate Officers: Personal Participation
Under traditional corporate law doctrine, piercing of the corporate veil is used to hold owners (shareholders) of a corporation liable, 22 not officers. 23 Officers generally are shielded from liability for the wrongful acts of their corporation unless they personally participated in a tort or other wrongful acts 24 379, 380 & n.4 (1999) .
Oh conducted an updated study in 2010, examining over 2,900 cases and finding that piercing occurred in almost 50% of the cases, but again, only against close corporations and corporate groups. Peter B. Oh, VeilPiercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 110 (2010) . 21 See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 14, at § 41.35, at pp. 665-66 ("[T] he mere fact that all or almost all of the corporate stock is owned by an individual or a few individuals will not afford sufficient grounds for disregarding corporateness.").
22 Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978 Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305 (2004 . 23 See Crigler v. Salac, 438 So.2d 1375 , 1380 (Ala. 1983 ) (citing L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 455 (5 th Cir. 1980 ) (individual officer liability for tortious acts "does not depend upon the same grounds as 'piercing the corporate veil,' that is, inadequate capitalization, use of the corporate form for fraudulent purposes, or failure to comply with the formalities of corporate organization"). 24 See Donsco, 587 F.2d at 606 ("A corporate officer is individually liable for the torts he personally commits and cannot shield himself behind a corporation when he is an actual participant in the tort."). Corporate officers do not incur similar liability for contractual obligations arising out of corporate activities. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958) ("A person making . . . a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract.").
Parent corporations who are actively involved in the activities of their subsidiaries may be held directly liable for that involvement, see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 60-61 & n.8 (1998) , in addition to be held indirectly liable as a shareholder (owner) under piercing analysis. 25 See JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 3.13 (1982) ("Participation by an officer in a wrongful act of the corporation may be found not solely on the basis of direct action but may also consist of knowing approval or ratification of unlawful acts."); Oswald, supra note 7, at 118 (citing Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10 th Cir. 1958) ). For a discussion of the types of Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission their mere status as officers, 26 but rather because of their active participation in wrongful acts, 27 whether those wrongful acts consist of torts or statutory or regulatory violations.
28
The liability of corporate officers in such instances flows directly from traditional agency law principles that hold an agent personally liable for his or her own tortious conduct, even if he or she is acting on behalf of the principal. 29 Agency law provides that an individual's active participation in wrongdoing can lead to personal liability, even where the individual was acting in an official capacity as an agent of the corporation, or at the direction of his or her principal and not on the agent's own behalf. 30 In such instances, the plaintiff may pursue the REV. 1661 REV. , 1168 REV. -70 (2010 . 26 See Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841, 852 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("Courts have, however, consistently stated that a corporate executive will not be held vicariously liable, merely by virtue of his office, for the torts of his corporation"), aff'd, 658 F.2d 1256 (9 th Cir. 1981) . Bernstein v. Starret City, Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ; Bowling v. Holdeman, 413 NE.2d 1010 , 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980 . 27 See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1 st Cir. 1980 ) (noting requirement of "personal involvement by the corporate officers in some decision or action which is causally related to plaintiff's injury"); Mill Run Assocs. v. Locke Prop. Co., 282 F.Supp.2d 278, 287 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (noting "general, if not universal, rule . . . that an officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by the corporation is personally liable therefor . . . ."); 3A FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1137 ("An officer or director of a corporation is not personally liable for torts of the corporation or of its other officers and agents merely by virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur personal liability by participating in the wrongful activity."). The scope of director liability is not explored in this article.
28 Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 25 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1987 ) ("Furthermore, personal responsibility for corporate liability may attach when the individual's wrongful conduct causes the violation of a statute and accompanying regulations."). 29 Note that a corporate director (as opposed to an officer) is not the corporation's agent and so is not at risk of this same type of individual liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (2006) ("Neither the board of directors nor an individual director of a business is, as such, an agent of the corporation or of its members.") As explained in the Restatement, the individual director "has no power of his own to act on the corporation's behalf, but only as one of the body of directors acting as a board. Even when he acts as a member of the board, he does not act as an agent, but as one of the group which supervises the activities of the corporation." Id. cmt. b. Where the director also serves as an officer of the corporation, however, he or she is "necessarily an agent, and normally a general agent, of the corporation, since he [or she] acts on its behalf and subject to its control exercised through the board of directors." Id. This is just another variant of recognizing the different "hats" that an individual may wear within a corporation.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) ("An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the principal . . . ."); 3A FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 1135) ("An individual is personally liable for all torts which that individual committed, notwithstanding the person may have acted as an agent or under directions of another. This rule applies to torts committed by those acting in their official capacities as officers or agents of a corporation.").
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An officer may also be a shareholder (even the sole shareholder) of a corporation, but in that instance, traditional doctrine dictates that the court should recognize the different hats the individual is wearing and should distinguish carefully the grounds on which liability is being imposed. In the leading case of Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 32 for example, the Third Circuit emphasized that while the individual at issue being held personally liable was both a shareholder and an officer, the individual's liability stemmed from his role "as an actor rather than as an owner. 
C. Liability of the Corporation for Acts of Corporate Officers
Under the well-known doctrine of respondeat superior, the wrongdoing of the officer, as agent, can be imputed to the corporation, rendering both the individual and the corporation liable. As explained in an 1858 case:
A corporation can only act by their [sic] agents. It can act only by those who are in their employ. And when one in the employ of a corporation, in the business of his employment, does an act for their benefit, and which they adopt, and 31 See Strang v. Hollowell, 387 S.E.2d 664, 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990 ) (citations omitted):
It is well settled that one is personally liable for all torts committed by him, including negligence, notwithstanding that he may have acted as agent for another or as an officer for a corporation. Furthermore, the potential for corporate liability, in addition to individual liability, does not shield the individual tortfeasor from liability. Rather, it provides the injured party a choice as to which party to hold liable for the tort. 32 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978) . 33 Id. at 606. 34 Id. 35 
Id.
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36
This is a one-way street of imputed liability, however: the corporation is liable, as the principal, for the actions of the officer as agent., There is no rule holding the officer liable for the corporation's actions or liabilities merely because the individual holds the position of officer. Rather, the officer's liability must stem from his or her own personal participation in the the acts creating the liability, not her or her status.
II. INDIVIDUAL OFFICER LIABILITY FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
The Federal Circuit has adopted a clearly inapposite doctrine-piercing of the corporate veil-to assess the personal liability of corporate officers for patent infringement. As discussed above, piercing is a traditional corporate doctrine used to set aside the corporate form to hold corporate owners liable.
37 While this deviation from traditional doctrine can be explained partially by the specialized path that patent appeals takes, the statutory framework of the Patent Act and the court's desire to constrain the expansive strict liability of direct patent infringement more likely impel adoption of this misplaced theory.
A. Patent Infringement and the Role of the Federal Circuit
Infringement Liability Generally Under the Patent Act
Patent infringement is often described in traditional common law terms. A patent is a property interest of the patent holder, 38 infringement of the patent is a tortious taking of that property, and the patent infringer is thus a tortfeasor. 39 However, overlaid on these common law characteristics is the specific statutory scheme of patent infringement found in the Patent Act of 1952. The Patent Act addresses both direct and indirect patent infringement in separate sections of Section 271. In particular, Section 271(a) imposes direct infringement liability on "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent . . . ."
41 Section 271(a) has no intent element and so direct patent infringement is a strict liability offense. 42 While a defendant's lack of willfulness or lack of bad faith may affect the availability of enhanced damages under the Patent Act, 43 it does not mitigate the imposition of liability itself.
The Patent Act also contemplates two forms of indirect infringement liability (only one of which, inducement of infringement, is relevant to officer liability). Neither form of indirect infringement can exist in the absence of direct infringement by another. 44 Section 271(b)
addresses inducement of infringement and provides: "Whoever actively induces infringement shall be liable as an infringer." 45 The courts interpret this language as encompassing a broad range of actions, such as licensing, indemnification of third parties for infringement, design or purchase of infringing items, and repair or maintenance of infringing items. 46 Unlike the strict liability of direct infringement, inducement of infringement has an intent element.
47
The second form of indirect liability recognized by the Patent Act is contributory infringement. Section 271(c) holds liable "a party who sells a component with knowledge that the component is especially designed for use in a patented invention, and is not a staple article 41 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Utility patents typically extend for twenty years from the date of patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 154. Design patents endure for fourteen years from date of patent issuance. Id. § 173. 42 See, e.g., Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 , 2065 n.2 (2011 ("Direct infringement has long been understood to require no more than the unauthorized use of a patented invention . . . . [A] direct infringer's knowledge or intent is 'irrelevant.'"); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566 , 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996 ) ("Infringement itself . . . is a strict liability offense."). 43 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (the court, in its discretion, may increase damages up to three times the amount found or assessed). 44 See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitrim Corp., 406 U.S. 578 (1972); Joy Techs. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993 ) ("Liability for either active inducement of infringement or for contributory infringement is dependent upon the existence of direct infringement."). [The Federal Circuit seemed to call this into question in Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2012 47 After some degree of confusion in the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in 2011 that inducement of infringement "requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement," Global Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068, and that "knowledge" encompasses "willful blindness." Id. at 2068-69.
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50
Although contributory infringement also has an intent element, it focuses more on the nature of the item sold than upon the status of the seller, and thus is not discussed further in this manuscript.
The Special Case of Federal Circuit Precedent
The federal courts are composed primarily of courts of general jurisdiction. 51 While most federal law issues go to the regional circuit courts of appeal, patent cases fall under the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit is a relative newcomer to the federal court system, having been created on October 1, 1982. The creation of this specialized appellate court has had profound effects upon the development of patent infringement doctrine, 52 including officer liability doctrine.
Prior to creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, appeals of patent cases were taken from the federal district courts to the regional circuit courts of appeals, while appeals from decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") were taken to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 53 Because each of the regional circuits sets its own precedents, interpretation of patent law could (and did) vary significantly from circuit to circuit, leading to forum-shopping by litigants. 54 Concerns about the efficacy and efficiency of patent law, coupled with a faltering economy, fear of decreasing American global commercial competitiveness, and the demands of 48 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 49 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 , 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990 Two characteristics in particular distinguish the Federal Circuit from its sister circuits. First, unlike the regional circuit courts, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is based solely on subject matter; geography plays no role. Second, the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction over specific subject matter, and that jurisdiction is exclusive; i.e., it is not shared with other intermediate appellate courts. These subject matters include, in addition to patents, an eclectic mishmash of other topics: international trade, government contracts, certain trademark issues, federal personnel issues, veteran's benefits, and public safety officers' benefit claims. 56 Thus, the Federal Circuit is not exclusively a patent appellate court, which reflects a deliberate decision by Congress to create a specialized appellate court with a varied docket.
57
Nonetheless, patent cases now form the largest segment of the Federal Circuit's caseload, comprising 47%, or almost one-half, of the appeals filed before the Federal Circuit in FY 2013.
58
The next largest category of cases pertained to personnel actions, which comprised only 17% of the total number of appeals filed. 59 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Federal Circuit is often viewed as a "patent court."
60
Moreover, the specialized jurisdiction and patent-centric focus of the Federal Circuit's caseload means that it does not see the broad range of cases presented to the regional circuits. This, in turn, contributes to the court's erroneous interpretation and application of traditional doctrine in the context of individual officer liability for patent infringement.
B.
The This rich docket assures that the work of the proposed court will be broad and diverse and not narrowly specialized. The judge will have no lack of exposure to a broad variety of legal problems. Moreover, the subject matter of the new court will be sufficiently mixed to prevent any special interest from dominating it.
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66 Id. at 945.
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The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that managing officers of corporations were generally not liable for patent infringement of the corporation even if the infringement was "committed under their general direction." 69 However, the Dangler court went on to state, an officer could be held jointly liable with the corporation based upon his or her own acts:
It is when an officer acts willfully and knowingly-that is, when he personally participates in the manufacture or sale of the infringing article (acts other than an officer), or when he uses the corporation as an instrument to carry out his own willful and deliberate infringements, or when he knowingly uses an irresponsible corporation with the purpose of avoiding personal liability-that officers are held jointly liable with the company.
70
The officers in Dangler were not held liable because the corporation was "a bona fide corporation" active in a field in which there were numerous patents (thus making it difficult for the corporation to evaluate whether its actions might infringe), and the corporation had sought appropriate legal counsel before proceeding. 71 Thus, the court concluded, the case fell "far short of establishing any one of the situations for which the officer of the corporation may be held liable for the infringements of the corporation."
72
Dangler's general rule that "in the absence of some special showing, the managing officers of a corporation are not liable for the infringements of such corporation, though committed under their general direction" 73 was adopted by many subsequent courts. 
Post-1982: The Development of Federal Circuit Doctrine
The Federal Circuit issued its first opinion on October 28, 1982, in which it adopted as binding precedent "the holdings of our predecessor courts, the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, announced by those courts before the close of business 30 September 1982," but declared itself not bound by the decisions of the regional circuit courts of appeal.
77 Thus, while the Federal Circuit started out with a substantial body of precedent upon which to draw, it also started out with significant freedom to create and develop its own precedents and doctrines.
a. Early Federal Circuit Cases: Erroneous Adoption of Piercing Analysis
Officer liability issues arose before the Federal Circuit soon after its creation, and just as quickly took a wrong analytical turn that continues to plague officer liability doctrine. The first such case to come before the Federal Circuit was Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 78 in 1986. The Orthokinetics court found that three individuals, all officers and shareholders of two corporations accused of infringement, could be held individually liable for 75 See, e.g., White, 509 F.2d at 292-93 (defendant "was the incorporator, president, majority stockholder, and moving force which resulted in the manufacture of the accused device [and] participated in the manufacture and sale of his machine"); International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 728-29 (9 th Cir. 1964 ) (defendant-officer was the "moving active conscious force" behind the corporation's infringement and "is therefore subject to personal liability without regard to whether [the corporation" is his alter ego); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428, 435 (1 st Cir. 1956 ) (defendant-officer "was the moving, active conscious force behind" the corporation's infringement Cir. 1956 ) (holding liable defendant-officer who deliberately designed the infringing product and who "was at all times in control of the administrative and managerial policy of the corporation"); Southwestern Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 98 F.2d 42, 45-46 (10 th Cir. 1938 ) (holding liable defendant-officer who used the corporation "as an instrument to carry out his own deliberate infringement").
77 S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982 ) (en banc).
78 806 F.2d 1565 , 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986 ).
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The Orthokinetics court began by examining the officers' liability for direct infringement under Section 271(a) of the Patent Act, making two conflicting statements with regard to such liability. First, the court stated that "[i]nfringement is a tort and officers of corporation are personally liable for tortious conduct of the corporation if they personally took part in the commission of the tort or specifically directed other officers, agents, or employees of the corporation to commit the tortious act." 80 This statement is, of course, a reiteration of the general principles of general tort and agency law that typically govern the personal liability of corporate officers 81 and is unobjectionable on its face.
However, the Orthokinetics court went on to state that evaluating the personal liability of corporate officers "under § 271(a) requires invocation of those general principles relating to piercing the corporate veil." 82 In doing so, the court muddled doctrine relating to owner liability (piercing) with that relating to officer liability (personal participation). Moreover, the court's recitation of the facts indicated that the court did not give sufficient weight to the different roles that individuals can play within a corporation-i.e., as shareholders (owners) and managers (officers)-and the differing standards of liability that should apply to each such role. For example, the court emphasized that the individuals were the sole owners of the corporations at issue, yet did not discuss evidence of abuse of the corporate form that would permit the court to pierce the corporate veil and hold those individuals personally liable.
83
Rather, the court emphasized that the individuals "were directly responsible for the design and production of the infringing [products] and that they were the only ones who stood to benefit from sales of those [products] ."
84
It is hard to divine the relevance of these two factors for either officer or owner liability. The mere fact that a corporate owner is in a position to benefit from the sale of an infringing device is insufficient grounds to impose liability upon him or her: 79 Id. 80 Id. at 1579. 81 See supra Part I.B. 82 Id. at 1579. 83 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing piercing) 84 Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579.
Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission Even in their role as shareholders, the individuals are not automatically liable simply because they are likely to profit monetarily from the corporation's infringing acts. A rule so holding would make all shareholders automatically personally liable if illegal or infringing acts of the corporation led to financial gain, even if those acts were unintentional or inadvertent. Rather, the additional indicia needed to pierce the corporate veil must be shown before shareholders forfeit the protection of the corporate form. 85 The relevance of monetary benefit is even more attenuated in the officer liability context, where every officer can be said to benefit from the corporation's profitability and financial stability, if only in the sense of an enhanced likelihood of employment, but where the officer has no direct claim on the corporation's profits, as would a shareholder.
The Orthokinetics court's consideration of the individual's "direct[] responsib [ility] for the design and production of the infringing" 86 items is equally perplexing as a factor relating to officer liability. Although direct participation in a tortious act can lead to individual officer liability, the Orthokinetics court did not inquire into such direct participation by the corporate officers, seeming instead to ground its analysis in the fact that the individuals, as officers, had the authority to control the corporation's acts. In so doing, the Orthokinetics court opened the door to a broad statement of officer liability, as officers always have the authority to control the corporation.
The Orthokinetics court then turned its attention to the officers' liability for indirect infringement under Section 271(b), once again incorrectly interjecting corporate owner liability standards into corporate officer liability analysis. The court stated: "it is well settled that corporate officers who actively aid and abet their corporation's infringement may be personally liable for inducing infringement under § 271(b) regardless of whether the corporation is the alter ego of the corporate officer." This, of course, suggests that an officer can be the alter ego of the corporation; the alter ego theory, however, requires a "unity of interest and ownership" held only by corporate owners. 87 Certainly, an officer can be liable for inducement of infringement under Section 271(b), but that liability is grounded in the officer's own acts of aiding and abetting direct infringement by the corporation, and requires a showing of intent. The Orthokinetic court's erroneous adoption of piercing analysis and alter ego theory to reach corporate officers quickly took firm root in Federal Circuit case law. In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 89 in 1990, the court found that two corporate officers 90 were not liable for direct infringement under Section 271(a) because the required "evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil" was not present. 91 The Manville court stated that "[a]lthough facts support the conclusion that the officers had knowledge of their acts, these acts were within the scope of their employment and thus were protected by the corporate veil." 92 The Manville court also found that the district court had erred in imposing individual liability upon the officers even though the district court had found that the officers were not the alter ego of the corporation. 93 Thus, the Manville court displayed a complete lack of understanding of the differing roles of owners and officers in corporations, and the differing standards of liability that apply to each such role.
The Federal Circuit attempted to correct its wrong direction on officer liability in Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc. 94 in 1996, but the remedial measures were short-lived. Although the use of the term "control" is concerning because of its lack of precision, 99 and suggests that mere ability to control, rather than actual exercise of the same, is sufficient, the remainder of the state articulates the correct rule: an officer may be held personally liable for his or her personal participation in the wrongdoing.
Unfortunately, while Hoover Group seemed to be backing away from the statements in Orthokinetics and Manville that individual liability can only be based in a piercing of the corporate veil, it did not completely jettison application of piercing analysis to corporate officers. Rather, the Hoover Group court found that individual officer liability for direct infringement under Section 271(a) could be based in either a piercing of the corporate veil or personal participation by the corporate officer 100 -effectively, getting only one-half of the analysis correct. Moreover, the court's explanation for why the officers involved were not liable was inaccurate; further, it erroneously indicated that officer liability could not be imposed in the absence of veil piercing:
Unless the corporate structure is a sham, as is not here asserted, personal liability for inducement to infringe is not automatic but must be supported by personal culpability. The district court did not find bad faith or fraud or culpable intent on the part of [the individual]. The court erred in imposing liability although the corporate veil was not pierced.
101
The Federal Circuit's next foray into officer liability, in Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International, Inc., 102 There was a second issue involving inducement and willful infringement in the case that is beyond the scope of this paper. At trial, the jury found that O'Rourke was not personally liable for infringement, but that the "defendants" willfully infringed. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") that individual was personally liable for infringement on the grounds that a corporation does not act independently of its sole principal and that a finding of willful infringement by the corporation is necessarily a finding of willful infringement by that principal as well. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court's logic-that "a person that incorporates him or herself to conduct business can never escape personal liability for willful infringement by the corporation," id. at 1292,-was erroneous. Rather, the appellate court noted, the standard for personal liability is Cir. 1997) ). Interestingly, the appellate court's rather muddled analysis seemed to suggest that the appellate court was implicitly recognizing the distinction between the liability of owners (where the corporation must be a "sham") and the liability of officers (which requires personal culpability), albeit in the specific context of willful infringement:
Under the district court's logic, a person that incorporate s him or herself to conduct business can never escape liability for willful infringement by the corporation. This is inconsistent with our case law. Unless the corporate structure is a sham, we have held that personal liability for inducement must be supported by personal culpability. This requires the officer to have possessed a specific intent to "aid and abet" the infringement. A primary consideration for willful infringement, on the other hand, is whether the infringer had a good faith belief that the patent was invalid and/or not infringed. The two standards are not the same. For example, a corporate officer could negligently believe that a patent was invalid and/or not infringed. This might support a finding of willful infringement by the corporation, but not a finding of personal liability for the officer.
Id. at 1292 (citations omitted).
112 Id. at 1295 (citing Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360 , 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004 ) (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 , 1574 -75 (Fed. Cir. 1984 ).
Oswald The appellate court's analysis in Wechsler was a correct application of piercing analysis in the context of O'Rourke's status as a shareholder. However, the plaintiff lumped owner and officer liability together, and the appellate court never drew the explicit distinctions that would clarify: (1) that piercing and alter ego doctrine was relevant to O'Rourke only in his status as a corporate owner, and (2) that any liability that might attach to him in his role as corporate officer would have to be based on personal participation (or personal "culpability," as the Wechsler court called it).
In 2010, a chink in the Federal Circuit's piercing doctrine began to emerge in Wordtech Systems v. Integrated Networks Solutions. 121 Although the Federal Circuit again applied a piercing analysis to individual officers, this time the court also hinted at the problematic nature of its precedent. The corporation at issue was a small family business, managed by the two sons of the founder, both of who denied they were officers but admitted they ran the company. 122 The jury had found the corporation and two individual defendants liable for direct patent infringement, as well as for inducement of infringement and contributory infringement. Imposition of personal liability upon the two individuals in the absence of instructions about whether the entity was indeed a valid corporation and about piercing of the corporate veil was, in the appellate court's view, "plain error that requires a new trial," as the plaintiff bore the burden of showing that either the entity was not a valid corporation when the individuals committed infringing acts on its behalf (and thus was not protected by limited liability) or that the corporation was valid and its veil should be pierced under state law. The plaintiff in Hall sued Bed, Bath & Beyond for design patent infringement, also alleging inducement of infringement by Farley Nachemin, the Vice-President and General Merchandise Manager. The plaintiff cited Orthokinetics' language that "'it is well settled that corporate officers who actively aid and abet their corporation's infringement may be personally liable for inducing infringement under § 271(b) regardless of whether the corporation is the alter ego of the corporate officer.'" 135 The Hall court rejected the imposition of liability on the officer on the basis of New York veil-piercing doctrine, which requires a "'two-part showing: (i) that the owner exercised complete domination over the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue; and (ii) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong that injured the party seeking to pierce the veil.'" 136 Thus, the New York doctrine itself revealed that veil-piercing is relates to owner liability, not officer liability, 137 and thus was inapposite to the case before it, where the individual was clearly liable only as an officer, not an owner. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit did not reach the merits of this argument. The district court had dismissed the action against the individual on the grounds that the allegedly infringing activity by the individual had occurred before the patent had issued and thus was not actionable. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal on these procedural timing grounds.
C. Summary
Why does the Federal Circuit persist in applying the blatantly incorrect piercing doctrine to the evaluation of the personal liability of corporate officers for patent infringement? One However, as the next Part illustrates, the regional circuit courts of appeal also apply inapposite theories in assessing the individual liability of corporate officers for copyright infringement, although their errors take them down a different analytical path. The fact that 138 The terms "pierc!", "corporate," and "veil" were searched in Federal Circuit cases LEXIS Advance from 1982 to March 16, 2014, resulting in 365 cases. The search was then narrowed to "corporate veil," resulting in 35 cases. Those cases were examined to determine if the rationale behind veil piercing was discussed in substantial detail, or whether the doctrine was only referred to in a cursory manner, without analysis. both copyright and patent law use analytically incorrect theories to assess officer liability suggests that while the Federal Circuit's specialized jurisdiction might be one factor in the incorrect articulation of officer liability for patent infringement, other factors are likely at play as well.
III. INDIVIDUAL OFFICER LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Individual officer liability in the copyright arena has received less scholarly attention than in the patent arena. This is likely at least in part because the courts house officer liability for copyright infringement in vicarious liability, which, on its face, at least, appears to be a more doctrinally sound theory, less in need of commentary and criticism. However, closer examination reveals that that vicarious liability theory used for officer liability for copyright infringement also rests on shaky theoretical foundations.
In many ways, copyright infringement looks similar to patent infringement. Infringement of the copyright is a tort, and the copyright infringer is a tortfeasor.
143 However, the avenue for appeals is different in patent and copyright cases. While appeals in patent cases are heard by a specialized intermediate appellate court-the Federal Circuit-appeals in copyright cases go to the regional circuit courts of appeal. Two significant consequences flow from this difference. First, because there are multiple circuit courts involved, each of which sets its own precedent, there is a potential for circuit splits in copyright law that does not exist in patent law. 144 Second, because the regional circuit courts are generalist, not specialized, courts, they hear cases across a much more diverse range of topics. They are far more likely than the Federal Circuit to hear cases posing issues of traditional corporate, agency, and tort law concepts and in a much broader expanse of settings. This suggests that the regional circuits should be more adept than the Federal Circuit in correctly applying traditional doctrine to federal intellectual property issues. In fact, however, while courts seldom turn to application of piercing doctrine to hold corporate officers liable for copyright infringement, 145 copyright infringement cases do reveal other articulations of officer liability that are at odds with traditional doctrine.
A. Infringement Liability Under Copyright Law
As in patent law, it is not difficult in copyright law to impute infringement liability for the acts of officers to the corporation. Traditional corporate, agency, and tort doctrines apply, and respondeat superior is invoked to hold the master (e.g., the corporation) liable for the infringing acts of the agent (employee or officer). 146 The more difficult and provocative question in copyright law, like patent law, is under which circumstances should the officer be held individually liable for infringement-a question made more complicated in the copyright area by the Copyright Act's more limited statutory infringement provisions.
Direct Infringement
The statutory language of the Copyright Act provides for direct infringement (but not indirect, i.e., secondary, infringement). 147 The actor who engages in infringing actions under the case law has evolved such that indirect liability for copyright infringement now takes one of two forms: (1) "vicarious liability," which imposes liability upon a party who "has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities," 156 and (2) "contributory infringement," which imposes liability upon a party who has "knowledge of the infringing activity [and] induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another" 157 (and which in generally viewed as a subset of vicarious liability. 158 Thus, indirect copyright infringement, which speaks of "vicarious liability" and "contributory infringement," is similar to, but does not quite parallel, indirect patent infringement, which statutorily defines "inducement of infringement" and "contributory infringement."
Unfortunately, in practice, the categories of direct and indirect copyright infringement do not line up as neatly as the preceding discussion might suggest. The Sony Court noted in 1984 that the "'lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn. '" 159 In fact, the Sony Court used contributory infringement and vicarious liability interchangeably, reasoning that the second is merely a subcategory of the The courts do not view the lack of formal statutory language as an impediment to imposition of indirect liability for copyright infringement. However, the absence of explicit statutory language has caused indirect copyright infringement to evolve through the courts in a messy and chaotic manner, as the courts have drawn upon both general tort and agency doctrine and have analogized to statutory patent infringement liability in devising liability for indirect copyright infringement under the common law. This leads the courts naturally to vicarious liability. In the words of one district court:
The theory of vicarious liability developed from the law of agency, specifically employer-employee relationships, in which the "master" was held strictly liable for the torts of a "servant." Various legal concepts were fashioned to explain this liability, including the concepts of "control," "right to control," and "manner and means of performance." As further explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading case of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 163 :
The absence of . . . express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another. Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission However, the courts do not just turn to traditional common law doctrine in fleshing out copyright indirect infringement liability; they also turn to statutory patent law. As a result, the relationship between indirect infringement under the Patent Act and in copyright law is oddly incestuous. For example, the Sony Court noted the lack of "precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability" on the particular theory asserted by the plaintiff, and then drew upon "[t]he closest analogy"-patent law-noting that it was "appropriate to refer [to patent liability rules] because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law."
165 Ultimately, the Sony Court turned to contributory patent infringement law in articulating a standard for copyright contributory infringement. 166 Two decades later, in MGM Studios v. Grokster, 167 the Supreme Court acknowledged the Sony Court's borrowing of contributory infringement from the Patent Act for copyright law, and used it as grounds for turning to the inducement language from Section 271(b) of the Patent Act in analyzing the meaning of intent for inducement of infringement in the copyright area. 168 The Grokster copyright intent language was then relied upon by the Federal Circuit in analyzing intent for inducement of infringement under the Patent Act, 169 completing a circle from the Patent Act to copyright common law to judicial interpretation of the Patent Act.
Thus, indirect copyright infringement law is an unusual amalgamation of common law tort doctrine and statutory patent law concepts, developed and created through the courts on a case-by-case basis. As characterized by Grossman, the end result is an "equitable, common law mush produced by courts trying to do justice in individual cases, often relying upon no more than analogies to other areas of the law." 170 In particular, "the primordial cases for . . . vicarious liability evidence no grand principle in the making, nor even a distinct doctrine." 171 165 Id. at 439. The plaintiff argued that the defendant should be held liable because "it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted materials." Id. 166 Id.
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
168 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 ("For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here . . . ."). Grossman summarized the early development of vicarious liability for copyright infringement, concluding that:
The early cases show courts trying to distinguish based almost exclusively on policy between business arrangements to which no copyright liability should attach and those to which it should. Absentee landlords provide the paradigm of innocence, while proprietors of entertainment and hospitality establishments are found liable for the infringing performance of their employees and independent contractor orchestras.
172
The modern articulation of vicarious liability as an explicit theory for indirect copyright infringement liability stems from the leading case of Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 173 decided by the Second Circuit in 1963. 174 Faced with an allegation that a store that allowed a concessionaire to sell infringing copies of musical recordings on its premises should itself be held liable for infringement, the court noted that it was faced with a "legal problem vexing in its difficulty, a dearth o[f] squarely applicable precedents, a business setting so common that the dearth of precedents seems inexplicable, and an almost complete absence of guidance from the terms of the Copyright Act" 175 (a characterization that seems apt for the officer liability area as well).
In examining how far liability for copyright infringement should extend, the H.L. Green Co. court noted that its inquiry was one of having "to trace, case by case, a pattern of business relationships which would render one person liable for the infringing conduct of another." 176 Thus, traditional respondeat superior doctrine would apply to hold a master liable for copyright infringement by a servant within the normal scope of his or her employment.
177 However, the court saw no reason to cling to formal employer-employee relationship distinctions as opposed to considering broader relationships arising out of independent contract, license, and lease. When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impairedthe purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.
179
The H.L. Green Co. court was looking at vicarious liability in the context of trying to determine when to hold one defendant liable for the acts of another actor with which it had a business relationship. It was not contemplating the question of when liability should attach to an individual whose connection to the copyright infringement is based in his or her role as an officer.
The courts have since condensed the H.L. Green Co. court's statement into a concise, two-prong test for vicarious copyright liability, finding that vicarious liability attaches when the defendant has: (1) the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct, and (2) "an obvious and direct financial interest" in the infringing activity.
180 Although a straightforward test is appealing to courts because of its simplicity, the distillation of the infringement into the relationship between the potential defendants as a simplistic test makes it too easy to impose liability upon an individual officer, as the next Section illustrates.
B. Officer Liability for Copyright Infringement
Individual officer liability for copyright infringement can arise in one of two ways. The first is actual participation in direct infringement, which arises from the statutory language of the Copyright Act. 181 The second, vicarious liability, arises from the case law, drawing upon officer liability in patent law; like patent law, it shows a disturbing deviation from traditional legal doctrine, although the deviation takes a different path. In theoretical terms, an officer can be held directly liable for copyright infringement based upon his own culpable actions-a principle that arises out of traditional tort liability notions. 182 As noted by one early court:
Direct Copyright Infringement
Since infringement constitutes a tort, common law notions of tort liability are relevant in fixing the scope of the statutory copyright remedy, and the basic common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tort-feasor is applicable in suits arising under the Copyright Act.
183
In practice, only a few courts have used personal participation by a corporate officer to support imposition of direct copyright infringement liability upon the individual, and they seldom probe deeply into the analysis. In 2013, in Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 184 for example, the district court noted that individuals can be held directly liable for their own actions under traditional doctrine: "'a corporate officer who directs, controls, ratifies, participates in, or is the moving force behind the infringing activity, is personally liable for such infringement.'" 185 However, this language was little more than expository, as the court went on to house the individual liability of the officer at issue in vicarious liability, without further discussion of direct infringement liability.
186
Bangkok Broadcasting & T.V. Co. v. IPTV Corp., 187 decided in 2010, is a rare example of an officer being held personally liable for direct copyright infringement. The district court applied traditional tort doctrine in assessing officer liability, noting: "Under Ninth Circuit precedent, 'a corporate officer or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he authorizes or directs or in which he participates, notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation and not on his own behalf. '" 188 This "basic principle," the court noted, applies across a number of fields, including trademark law, unfair competition, unfair business 182 See supra Part I.A.2.
183 Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) .
184 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172339 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) .
Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission practices, and, notably, copyright infringement. 189 The court further explained that cases imposing individual liability upon corporate officers typically have "'involved instances where the defendant was the "guiding spirit" behind the wrongful conduct, . . . or the "central figure" in the challenged corporate activity. '" 190 After determining that the corporation was liable for copyright infringement, the Bangkok Broadcasting court evaluated the individual liability of Ron Petcha, the CEO. In establishing that Petcha had control over or was the 'guiding spirit' behind the infringing activity the court pointed out that he: (1) had been the CEO since the corporation's founding; (2) personally hired all employees, selected programming, and arranged distribution agreements; and (3) personally negotiated the license renewal agreement at issue in the case.
191 Thus, Petcha was held jointly liable with the corporation for the copyright infringement.
192
The outcome in Bangkok Broadcasting is disturbing, for the acts of the officer that led to imposition of personal liability are the type of acts commonly undertaken by managers. Read on its face, the case seems to stand for a broad imposition of officer liability, and would seem to be a troubling extension of personal liability to all officers engaged in normal officer activities -hiring, negotiating, and managing the firm. However, the court's opinion also notes that the defendants had failed to counter the plaintiff's assertion of individual liability, 193 so perhaps a direct opposition would have changed the outcome.
The courts' reluctance to hold a corporate officer liable for personal participation in the copyright infringement undoubtedly stems from the strict liability standard of direct copyright infringement. The implications of strict liability for corporate officers in the copyright area are much the same as in the patent area: the corporate officer, theoretically at least, can be held individually liable and without fault or intent for personal participation in the infringing behavior. This result is harsh, 194 and so courts in the copyright area, as in the patent area, Under the traditional, two-pronged test for vicarious liability, imposition of vicarious liability upon the individual officer arises from the belief that the individual is able to police the conduct of the corporate infringer;
196 that control, when coupled with a financial interest (usually in the form of an ownership stake), leads to individual liability. 197 In Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 198 for example, the facts indicated that Mark Gorton was: (1) the sole Director of Lime Works, which was liable for copyright infringement, and (2) the CEO, 100% shareholder, and sole director of Lime Group. Lime Group was the controlling shareholder of Lime Works, owning 87% of the company. The court identified a number of factors that led to its finding that Gorton had the ability to supervise the infringing activity including: (1) Gorton's own testimony that he "ran" Lime Works; (2) testimony of the former COO that Gorton was "ultimate decision-maker"; (3) testimony by the former COO that Gorton's approval was required for "any major strategic or design decisions"; (4) testimony by a Lime Works employee that Gorton could "veto" development decisions; and (5) Gorton's heavy involvement in creating the program that was the core of the infringing activities and his knowledge of the infringing activities. 199 The court established that Gorton had a financial interest in the activity because as majority owner of Lime Works, Lime Group and Gorton by virtue of his 100% ownership of Lime Group, directly benefited from the infringing activity.
Vicarious Copyright Infringement Liability
In the context of copyright infringement doctrine, personal participation has become wrapped into the vicarious liability standard, shifting personal participation from direct Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission Famous Music test applies to direct copyright infringement-and certainly, some of the factors listed in the test, such as personal participation, are more logical in that context. Subsequent cases, however, have employed the test as a means for evaluating the vicarious liability of corporate officers, thus shifting the test to the indirect copyright infringement realm (and further illustrating the doctrinal and theoretical confusion of this arena). 206 On close examination, the Famous Music test is nonsensical. The factors are stated in the alternative-"or"-such that any one factor theoretically suffices to impose liability upon an individual actor. The implications of this are interesting. The first factor-personal participation-replicates the test for direct infringement liability, yet, as noted above, 207 courts have adopted this test in the context of indirect infringement. The second factor-financial benefit as a major shareholder-creates the potential for holding an officer liable merely because he holds dual roles as an officer and an owner-a result wholly in conflict with traditional corporate doctrine. 208 The third factor looks like a variant of the alter ego test,
209
while the fourth factor looks much like a "control" test. The second and fourth factors, combined together, closely mimic the traditional two-prong test for vicarious liability.
In practice, the individuals against whom infringement liability is sought under the Famous Music test tend to hold multiple roles within the corporation. Marvin Music Co. v 
Hints of Piercing Analysis in Copyright Cases
Noticeably absent from either the traditional two-pronged vicarious liability test or the Famous Music test is any reference to a piercing of the corporate veil. Thus, when the plaintiff in White v. Marshall 232 argued that an individual should be held personally liable for the corporation's alleged infringing activities based upon "the role he played-as an owner and manager in the corporation," 233 the court rejected the argument. As the court explained:
To 'pierce the corporate veil' is to hold the owners of a corporation to be personally liable for the corporation's liabilities. This is only done when 'the corporation's "affairs are organized, controlled, and conducted so that the corporation has no separate existence of its own and is the mere instrumentality of the shareholders and the corporate form is used to evade an obligation, gain an unjust advantage or to commit an injustice."' 234 However, piercing notions seem to be creeping into a few copyright officer liability cases. In 2010, in Word Music LLC v. Lynns Corp. of Am., 235 for example, the court recited the Famous Music multi-factor test for officer vicarious liability. 236 The officer, however, argued that he could only be liable under a piercing analysis, citing Orthokinetics. 237 The court acknowledged that Orthokinetics was a patent infringement case, but then went on to apply it, noting that Orthokinetics recognized personal participation in a tort as grounds for liability, as 231 Id. at *143 ("the evidence shows that as the company earned money from new subscriptions (some portion of Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission well as piercing. 238 The Word Music court then noted that the Orthokinetics court imposed liability on an individual who was the president and sole shareholder and was "directly responsible for the design and production of the infringing" products and "who stood to benefit from the sales" of said products. 239 By comparison, the officer in Word Music was the "sole officer, director and shareholder" of the defendant corporation, was the "ultimate authority" for decision-making at the corporation with regard to advertising, distribution and sales, "personally participated" in the decision to sell infringing products, "personally benefitted financially" from the sales of infringing products, and was "the dominant influence in the corporation and determined the policies that resulted in infringement." This, the court found, was sufficient to support direct infringement liability in the officer.
C. Summary
Imposition of individual liability upon corporate officers for copyright infringement is at doctrinal odds with traditional corporate, agency, and tort law doctrine. It is not, perhaps, as spectacularly wrong as the piercing analysis used by the Federal Circuit in the patent infringement arena, but it still cannot be reconciled with traditional doctrine. The inconsistency in analysis is clear even from the terminology used in this area. The courts analyze officer liability as a form of vicarious liability, yet vicarious liability is really a form of agency law that holds the master strictly liable for the torts of the servant. In the context of officer liability for copyright infringement, though, we are not dealing with a liability imputed to the corporation, but the individual liability of the officer based on his or her own conduct. It is really a directi.e., strict-liability that we are addressing.
Something must be driving the appellate courts-both the regional circuits in the instance of copyright law and the Federal Circuit in the instance of patent law-down the wrong path. As the next Part argues, that "something" is mostly likely the courts' discomfort with the imposition of strict liability and their machinations to avoid imposing such a harsh liability standard upon corporate officers.
IV. OFFICER LIABILITY IN A STRICT LIABILITY REGIME
We have seen that the courts confuse the bases for liability of officers with those of shareholders and try to force the personal liability of officers into vicarious liability categories when traditional doctrine would find the officers liable only for their direct participation in 238 Id. at *22. 239 Id. (quoting Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579).
Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission tortious acts. Courts and commentators often are not precise in applying traditional concepts of corporate, agency, and tort law. Such imprecision may be exacerbated by the narrow scope of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction and its lack of opportunity to apply these concepts over a broad range of cases.
Nevertheless, the explanation for the incorrect theories of officer liability that we have seen applied likely lies in the courts' profound discomfort with strict liability and its application to corporate officers and directors. Direct infringement under both patent law and copyright law is based on strict liability, although, as mentioned above, 240 that strict liability is less "strict" in the copyright area because the ameliorating influence of the fair use defense provides an "out" in copyright law that is lacking in patent law. Holding corporate officers strictly liable for infringement appears fundamentally unfair and inconsistent not only with traditional corporate, agency, and tort law, but the underlying purposes of strict liability regimes.
A. The Strict Liability Standard
Strict liability is generally defined as "liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence."
241
Modern common law generally applies strict liability for specific types of actions, such as hazardous activities 242 or the manufacture and sale of products, that cause harm to others.
Fundamentally, the question comes down to which party is better able to allocate the costs, insure against the risks, and reduce or warn against the inherent dangers of the activity at issue? Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission exploration of these policies is beyond the scope of this manuscript, the basic principles underlying them can be summed up easily.
Fairness, in this setting, rests on the notion that where both parties are blameless, the one who created the risk of harm and enjoyed the benefit of the activity should bear any ensuing loss. 245 As explained by Epstein:
[I]f the gains derived from certain activities are indeed as great as the defendant contends, there is all the more reason why he should pay for the harm those activities caused to the person or property of another, for, as against an innocent plaintiff who has nothing to do with the creation of the harm in question, it is only too clear that the defendant who captures the entire benefit of his own activities should, to the extent that the law can make it so, also bear its entire costs.
246
The economic efficiency arguments espoused in the strict liability context rest on the notion that maximization of societal welfare and an efficient free market demand that firms and consumers bear the true costs associated with the activities that they undertake; i.e., costs should be "internalized."
247 Forcing a firm to bear all of the costs associated with its activities ensures that the price charged consumers will be a true price (e.g., costs will not be shunted off onto non-compensated injured parties), thus eliminating market distortions and inefficiencies.
248
Strict liability can also assist in the spreading of risk. A firm forced to bear the costs of injuries occasioned by its activities can spread those risks among all consumers by raising prices enough to cover the liability. Each consumer can bear a small increase in price more easily than , where the court stated: "the neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues . . . .").
246 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY Law 27 (1980) . 247 See Barbara Ann White, Economizing on the Sins of our Past: Cleaning up Our Hazardous Wastes, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 899, 915-17 (1988) .
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Imposing liability on an individual corporate officer does not contribute to a sharing of risk. Risk sharing requires spreading the potential cost of harm among a wide class of beneficiaries (in this case, consumers and owners), and is accomplished through pricing.
Finally, liability imposed on corporate officers could promote deterrence, but only if the officer has knowledge of the infringement and the ability to prevent it. Imposing strict liability on officers without knowledge or control can have no deterrent effect.
C. Considering Strict Liability of Officers for Patent or Copyright Infringement
While the courts are willing to enforce the statutory strict liability schemes for corporations, they are more hesitant to impose such a harsh liability regime upon individual actors, such as officers. So, the courts have tried to devise alternatives that minimize the finding of direct infringement in both areas.
In the patent law field, the courts have turned to concepts relating to piercing of the corporate veil to assess officer liability. The problem with this, of course, is that it not only rewrites traditional corporate doctrine, but it essentially eliminates the protection of the corporate form for small and closely-held firms, where individuals are likely to wear dual hats as owners and officers.
In the copyright arena, the regional circuits have tended to avoid the application of direct infringement liability based on personal participation, and have instead turned to the indirect liability of vicarious infringement. However, the multi-factor test that they have articulated is a strange conglomeration of factors that suggests a desire to look to an officer's intent to infringe, yet is inartfully worded (to say the least).
The correct result would be to avoid direct infringement liability in almost all cases for officer liability in both patent and copyright cases, on the ground that it is virtually impossible for an officer, in his or her role as an officer, to personally undertake the acts that result in patent or copyright infringement. The corporation is indeed the direct infringer in the vast majority of cases.
That is not to say, however, the officer should avoid liability in every instance. Rather, the officer's liability should be indirect, and should be supported by the appropriate test for Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission such indirect infringement. In the patent arena, that is inducement of infringement, which has an explicit "intent" or scienter requirement.
Similarly, officer liability for copyright infringement should be grounded in intent. The current, multi-factor, Famous Music test does a very poor job of teasing out the officer's intent, as it is not only framed in the alternative (as though only a single factor would suffice to establish liability), but it also seems to mix in notions of corporate ownership when it considers factors such as financial benefits as a major shareholder.
"Control" seems to offer the best proxy for evaluating the personal liability of an officer, and there are suggestions of the courts using this criterion in both the patent and copyright areas. To the extent that a corporate officer knew of the corporation's infringement or was "willfully blind" to it, 254 and the officer was in a position to direct and decide whether the corporation did in fact infringe, it would seem to fair to hold that officer personally liable. Indeed, the Federal Circuit seems to be implicitly seeking fairness by using piercing analysis, which is an equitable doctrine, to assess personal liability.
It would not take a great leap in doctrine to reach this result under the existing "inducement of infringement" language in Section 271(b) of the Patent Act. However, it would require a rewriting of the existing Famous Music vicarious liability test in the copyright field. Rewriting that test is warranted and easily accomplished. First, the Famous Music test is already specific to the corporate officer inquiry and is distinct from the general vicarious liability standard set forth in H.L. Green Co. The regional circuits have already established that officer liability requires a more specialized test than the general vicarious liability standard. In addition, there is already an established pattern of borrowing between patent and copyright doctrine; it seems eminently reasonable for copyright law to borrow from patent law in the officer liability area as well, particularly since there is no good reason to have different standards for evaluating officer liability in the patent and copyright fields. In short, the courts can reach the "fair" result they seem to be seeking in the officer liability field without completely jettisoning traditional doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The distinction between liability as a shareholder and liability as an officer seems clear on its face. However, in both the patent and copyright arenas, principles of officer liability deviate from traditional principles of corporate, tort, and agency doctrine in manners that are Oswald --Officer Liability Draft--25 May 2014 Please do not quote or cite without permission inappropriate and that ignore the differences in the role of corporate officers and shareholders. While the differing statutory frameworks of patent and copyright law have caused officer liability in each area to devolve along different paths, in both areas, courts appear to have been motivated by a desire to limit inappropriate extension of strict liability to individual officersbut in both areas, they have gone about that effort in a manner that ignores traditional doctrine, and fails to provide corporate officers with appropriate protection from individual liability.
